書：《井中毒藥：核能時代開啟時的海中放射性廢棄物》（中文摘要）

書：《井中毒藥：核能時代開啟時的海中放射性廢棄物》

Hamblin, Jacob Darwin. 2008. Poison in the Well: Radioactive Waste In The Oceans At The Dawn of The Nuclear Age. Rutgers University Press.

Jacob Hamblin的著作《井中毒藥》一書描述了從第二次世界大戰到1972年倫敦公約(London Convention)間，科學家與政治家如何處理核能廢料問題。透過聚焦於美國與英國，Hamblin細緻地描繪科學社群、政治領域裡持續成長的衝突，與公眾對海中放射線廢棄物處置議題的覺醒。不甚熟悉此議題的讀者心中應會浮現以下問題：它是安全的嗎？諸多國家這樣做是不對的嗎？禁止它是正確的嗎？Hamblin分析此議題的方法是由「危險」這個概念出發，而此概念又與以下這兩個議題扣連在一起：暴露的程度與劑量，及如何決定其多寡。本書因此從一個最重要且基本的問題出發：如何決定臨界值？本書的第二個主題是突顯不同科學領域之間的衝突，也就是，到底該由健康物理學家(health physicists)或是海洋學家來定奪核廢棄物的相關議題。第三個主題是關於放射性廢料於冷戰時期國際關係裡的角色；作者詳細描述在冷戰時期中，以及在國家之間結盟合作的脈絡下，政治關係如何顯著地形塑核廢料的處理方式。最後，作者在處理放射線廢料與環境政策制定兩者關係時，主要關心的面向是公眾意見的角色與如何處理公眾的考量。

雖是生硬的放射線議題，Hamblin在書中提供給讀者相當可親的資訊。本書不是單純地重新回顧事實，而是生動地介紹個別人物、國內的、國際機構到國家與權力集團等。對於有興趣瞭解核能政策歷史的讀者而言，《井中毒藥》將是十分有用的一本書。科學研究與科技研究學者與學生，及環境政治、環境研究與環境史學者皆可因閱讀本書受益。 (本摘要原為 Sophia University的Graduate Program in Global Studies的 Tak Watanabe 教授在2011 春季班 開授課程的作業之一。)

- By Marlies Linhart, with translation by Kuan-Hung Lo (駱冠宏)

Editors’ Note: This is a Chinese translation of a Teach 3.11 annotation. We invite volunteers to translate and/or contribute content in Korean, Japanese, and Chinese languages. Thank you.

編輯的話: 本文為本站已發表的英文摘要之中文翻譯，我們誠摯地邀請有志者協助我們翻譯或撰寫韓文，日文，或中文的摘要。謝謝。

書本章節:「起始與暫緩」（中文摘要）

Editors’ Note: This is a Chinese translation of a Teach 3.11 annotation. We invite volunteers to translate and/or contribute content in Korean, Japanese, and Chinese languages. Thank you.

編輯的話: 本文為本站已發表的英文摘要之中文翻譯，我們誠摯地邀請有志者協助我們翻譯或撰寫韓文，日文，或中文的摘要。謝謝。

書本章節:「起始與暫緩: 國民黨，科學，與科技」(Greene, 2008)

Greene, J. Megan. 2008. “Starts and Stops: The Kuomintang and Science and Technology.” The Origins of the Developmental State in Taiwan, 14-46. Harvard University Press.

對日本東亞鄰國的核能研究源起感興趣的學者來說，Greene的台灣科學政策史，清楚地解釋核能物理這個領域，在國民黨政府在台灣著手科學研究的過程中的特別角色。在她The Origins of the Developmental State in Taiwan 一書中，特別是「起始與暫緩」一章中，描述了二戰後的一、二十年內，國民黨政府有制度、系統性地在台灣推廣核能研究。這些五零年代和六零年代所建立的核能研究機構中訓練出來的研究者，在八零年代後於核能安全和環境安全的相關公共爭議中擔當要角。該章分析核能研究在台灣早先由國家系統性建置而成的原因和過程。

Greene追蹤從1927年到1958年，國民黨對科學教育和應用研究機構的提倡。1927年到1949年國民黨政府仍在中國時，不遺餘力地支持科學教育和研究，然而到了五零年代，這樣的支持嘎然止息。國民黨政府的決策改變受到許多因素影響。舉例來說，科學機構所需的研究經費對缺乏資源的政府而言是筆不少的支出。再者，若國民黨政府在台灣投資昂貴的研究設施，將意味著「對這個島嶼的永久或等同於永久的承諾」，這與國民黨反攻大陸的計畫相抵觸。

在此歷史脈絡下，Greene認為1950年代的國民黨政府，之所以願意建立數個數個原子能研究機構，是因為意識到這類研究應用在軍事用途的可能性。在43頁到45頁，她描述了台灣最早建立的三個原子能研究機構，及這些機構和美國政府單位和研究機構彼此間的關係。

第一個機構是原子能委員會（AEC），在台灣與美國1955年簽署和平使用原子能協定之後成立，隸屬行政院。第二個機構則是1957年設立於國立清華大學的核能研究所，校園內設置了泳池式反應爐，其中部分資金來自美國原子能委員會，此反應爐在1961年開始運作。第三個機構是中山科學研究院，由行政院原子能委員會成立的軍事單位，在六零年代開始著手核能研究。

Greene的文章剖析國民黨政府對核能研究的興趣，並指出國民黨政府對核能專家培育的投資，和1950年代時國民黨對其他科學的漠然態度形成強烈對比。這個章節很適合關注國家領導科學或是研究冷戰期間不同科學領域的不同角色的課程。

- By Honghong Tinn (鄭芳芳), with translation by Hsiao-Ling Chen (陳曉齡)

書: 《地震國度: 日本地震的文化政治1868-1930 》（中文摘要）

Editors’ Note: This is a Chinese translation of a Teach 3.11 annotation. We invite volunteers to translate and/or contribute content in Korean, Japanese, and Chinese languages. Thank you.

《地震國度: 日本地震的文化政治1868-1930 》

Clancey, Gregory. 2006. Earthquake Nation: The Cultural Politics of Japanese Seismicity, 1868-1930. University of California Press.

《地震國度》幫助我們理解近期日本神戶、東北地區與關東等地區頻繁的地震活動背後的歷史脈絡。《地震國度》榮獲科技史年會（Society for the History of Technology）2007年的Sidney Edelstein獎。此書流暢地闡述日本明治時代中，關於地震學、建築、工程學、文化、政治、土地之間複雜的交互影響。 現代化（modernization）是日本明治時代（1868-1912）的重要特色。在此時期，地震學如何形塑日本社會中諸如「自然」、「科技」、「西方知識」（相較於日本或其他亞洲知識）等概念？地震活動及其相關科學、科技與經驗如何影響了國家建造（state-building）、現代化與日本帝國的擴張？作者 Clancey利用豐富且平易近人的案例來說明這些問題。

強度高達8級的濃尾地震是本書中主要分析的歷史事件。這是於1891年在名古屋附近發生的地震，導致7千人死亡，14萬人無家可歸，對明治政府是個嚴峻的考驗。為了分析「日本地震活動的文化政治性」，作者Clancey從1891年的濃尾地震談起，然後延伸到1923年震度7.9級的關東地震及火災，該地震摧毀東京與橫濱的多數建築，並導致約14萬2千人死亡。

Clancey的論點包括幾個複雜的面向，其中最核心的論點是：在明治時期現代化/西化熱潮下，西式磚瓦、石造建築贏在堅硬、永存且陽剛（作為一種現代文明的象徵），但木製日式建築被形容為脆弱、暫時且陰柔（作為一種被淘汰的傳統的符號）。當濃尾地震毀壞這些堅固石造建築時，濃尾地震已動搖了上述的象徵體系；木造建築於是被當作是具有良好彈性的傳統文化的象徵。雖然當地各地皆是許多日式建築崩壞的遺跡，但日本記者跟藝術家仍然再製了一個新論述來說明日本建築比起西方建築更具有良好彈性。此新論述激發了新的本土文化保護、國族主義式的論述，而這樣的論述也為日本國家建造計畫（state-building）的支持者所接受，此國家建造計劃最終轉變成帝國主義。

對於想使用精簡版本的老師或學生而言，Clancey曾發表一篇50頁關於濃尾地震的文章: Clancey, Gregory. 2006. “The Meiji Earthquake: Nature, Nation, and the Ambiguities of Catastrophe.” Modern Asian Studies 40: 909-951. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3876638.

- Translation by Kuan-Hung Lo

ARTICLE: Containing the Atom: Sociotechnical Imaginaries and Nuclear Power in the United States and South Korea (2009)

Jasanoff, Sheila, and Sang-Hyun Kim. 2009. “Containing the Atom: Sociotechnical Imaginaries and Nuclear Power in the United States and South Korea.” Minerva 47: 119-146. http://www.springerlink.com/content/y2738665782223l6/

By introducing the concept of “sociotechnical imaginaries,” this article examines and compares the historical differences of such imaginaries concerning nuclear power between the United States and South Korea. For the United States, the dominant imagery for nuclear power was a potentially “runaway” technology that required responsible “containment” to keep it under control, whereas South Korea regarded nuclear power as “atoms for development” and “a symbol of the power of science and technology” that the state desired to indigenize. The disparate imaginaries for nuclear power have evolved into not only diverged power-plant designs, but also different “civic epistemologies,” policies, and strategies on radioactive waste management and risk assessment in each country.

As Jasanoff and Kim point out, the imaginaries concept helps explain how the states and their citizens reacted to a variety of nuclear disasters and challenges such as Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and anti-nuclear movements. This imaginaries concept may also help students analyze how nations that have been embracing nuclear power technology such as Japan, the United States, South Korea, France, Germany, and others, react to the recent triple disasters in Japan on March 11, 2011. Moreover, this article could be used to help encourage students to think about and invent alternative sociotechnical imaginaries of nuclear power beyond containment and development options to contribute to a better understanding of the controversial technology.

–Ling-Fei Lin

ARTICLE: Social Decision-making Processes in Local Contexts: An STS Case Study on Nuclear Power Plant Siting in Japan (2007)

Juraku, Kohta, Tatsujiro Suzuki, and Osamu Sakura. 2007. “Social Decision-making Processes in Local Contexts: An STS Case Study on Nuclear Power Plant Siting in Japan.” East Asian Science, Technology and Society 1 (1): 53-75. Available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/51243p18300u0n84/.

In contrast to the worries over the ongoing incident in Fukushima, a study on nuclear power plant siting in Maki-machi, Niigata provides some interesting if not optimistic insights regarding decision-making processes about nuclear energy in Japan. Published in East Asian Science, Technology and Society in 2007, Juraku, Suzuki, and Sakura’s article introduces how the Tohoku Electric Power Corporation canceled its Maki-machi nuclear power plant plan in 2003 due to a series of local efforts, including a citizen’s referendum, a mayoral recall election, and antinuclear residents’ acquisition of land in the proposed area. Teachers and students interested in public engagement with respect to nuclear power plant siting will appreciate the authors’ fascinating delineation of Maki-machi’s complex local political and social structure as well as numerous intriguing events regarding the debate over the proposed nuclear power plant from the 1970s to 2003.

Juraku, Suzuki, and Sakura characterize their article as a sociological STS case study. They propose the concept of “relevant marginal actor” to identify a group of Maki-machi residents that advocated a citizen’s referendum in 1995 and an ordinance-based referendum in 1996 to allow residents to express their opinion. As this referendum movement group owned a different public image from the existing political cliques and antinuclear groups, referendum advocates successfully settled the debate over the proposed nuclear power plant. For Juraku, Suzuki, and Sakura, the relevant marginal actors in Maki-machi made a breakthrough in a “deadlocked situation” which lasted since the early ‘80s.

The excerpt below illustrates an intriguing and dramatic event described in this article, which throws light on how the history of nuclear energy rests in the hands of citizens residing in these localities:

“In other words, a referendum would be never carried out as long as Mayor Sato was in office. …. Consequently, the referendum movement group began a campaign to recall the mayor. It seemed that it would be very difficult to collect the necessary number of signatures to call for a recall election because it was not anonymous. It was predicted that citizens would hesitate to reveal their names in public. But, contrary to this prediction, the required number of signatures was collected in just 2 weeks. Mayor Sato recognized he had lost, and on December 15, 1995, he resigned of his own will before the recall election.” (Juraku, Suzuki, and Sakura 2007, 63)

— Honghong Tinn

Chia-Ling Wu, of the EASTS editorial board, shares her Chinese annotation of this article:

EASTS的「科技的公民參與」創刊號裡，東大的日本學者壽樂浩太等人，針對日本新瀉縣卷町興建核能電廠所展開的公投過程，強調地方文化與地方政治結構，如何影響科技政策決定。他們提出「相關邊緣行動者」的概念，認為在此案例中，相關邊緣行動者特別能打破科技爭議的死結。這個案例也是日本核能爭議的重要案例。1990年代中期，當時新瀉縣卷町的市長支持蓋核電廠，可是反核人士反對，並要求地方公投，但是市長拒絕。在此反核擁核的爭議中，有一個平常不涉入雙邊政治的 Takaaki Sasaguchi 出面辦理市民公投（約兩萬多人的小鎮），以 求公投的公正。這位 Sasaguchi 是當地一家著名清酒釀造的老闆，並在下一次的選舉就當選成市長。當時於1995年所進行的公投，投票率八成八，五成四反對。期間又有日本著名的文殊電廠輻射事件，隔年又有阪神大地震，居民反核變強，但是擁核人士質疑地方公投的正當性，藉由打官司處理此爭議。Sasaguchi 市長開始把地方設施土地賣給支持其反核政策的人士，但是擁核與東北電力仍透過各種行政官司上訴，其中也有些敗訴。總之結果是2003年東北電力撤銷了這次的建核案。對於日本民間如何以政治行動處理核電廠爭議，這篇論文提供了一個精彩的案例。— Chia-Ling Wu

For a Japanese abstract of this article, see EASTS.

Further readings:

Fujigaki, Yuko, 2009. “STS in Japan and East Asia: Governance of Science and Technology and Public Engagement.” East Asian Science, Technology and Society 3(4): 511-518. link

Fujigaki introduces an STS textbook chapter aiming to teach STS concepts by using the Monju Nuclear Power Plant Incidents in 1995.

Chen, Dung-Sheng and Chia-Ling Wu, eds. 2007. East Asian Science, Technology and Society 1 (1), a special issue on public participation in science and technology in East Asia. link

As Juraku, Suzuki, and Sakura’s article appears in this special issue, teachers and students may find its other articles helpful.

CHAPTER: “Starts and Stops” (2008): Nuclear Energy Research Institutes in Taiwan

Greene, J. Megan. 2008. “Starts and Stops,” The Origins of the Developmental State in Taiwan, 14-46. Harvard University Press.

For those interested in the origins of nuclear energy research by Japan’s East Asian neighbors, Greene’s history of science policy in Taiwan elucidates the extraordinary role of nuclear physics in the early history of the Kuomintang government’s investment in scientific research. Her book, in particular the chapter “Starts and Stops,” describes the state’s institution-building efforts to promote nuclear energy research in the first two decades after WWII. Since the 1980s, researchers trained at Taiwan’s nuclear research institutes, established in the ’50s and ’60s, have played an important role in public debates about nuclear energy’s safety and environmental impacts. This book chapter analyzes why and how nuclear energy research was institutionalized by the state in the first place.

Greene traces the historical changes in the Kuomintang government’s promotion of “science education and applied research institutions” from 1927 to 1958. While the Kuomingtang government enthusiastically supported science education and research in China from 1927 to 1949, it ceased to do so when it settled in Taiwan in the ’50s. Many factors contributed to the government’s change of heart. For example, the required scientific facilities were particularly costly for a government that lacked resources. Moreover, investment in such expensive facilities, which “represented a permanent or semipermanent commitment to the island,” contradicted the Kuomingtang leadership’s plan of mainland recovery.

In this historical context, Greene attributes the Kuomingtang government’s willingness to establish several atomic energy research institutions in the 1950s to the potential military applications of such research. From pages 43 to 45, she describes the first three atomic energy research institutions in Taiwan and their relationships with United States government agencies and research institutes.

The first such institution was the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), created under the Executive Yuan (the equivalent of the Cabinet or the Council of Ministers) after the Taiwanese government signed an agreement with the U.S. on the peaceful use of atomic energy in 1955. The second institution was a graduate program in nuclear physics at National Tsing Hua University in 1957. A “swimming pool” reactor, partially funded by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission in 1957, was installed at the university and started to function in 1961. The third institution was the Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology, a military unit established by the AEC, which participated in nuclear research in the 1960s.

Greene’s chapter contextualizes the Kuomingtang government’s interest in nuclear energy research, including its investment in nurturing generations of nuclear scientists, in contrast to its lukewarm attitude toward other sciences in the 1950s. This book chapter would be appropriate for classes interested in state-supported science as well as the various roles of different scientific disciplines during the Cold War.

– Honghong Tinn

ARTICLE: Technology Transfer Behind a Diplomatic Struggle: Reappraisal of South Korea’s Nuclear Fuel Project in the 1970s

Kim, Seong-Jun. 2009. “Technology Transfer Behind a Diplomatic Struggle: Reappraisal of South Korea’s Nuclear Fuel Project in the 1970s.” Historia Scientiarum 19(2): 184-193.

Seong-Jun Kim explores the Nuclear Fuel Project, a failed attempt by the government and scientists of South Korea to import nuclear fuel cycle facilities from France, Canada, and Belgium during the 1970s. For courses interested in the historical development of nuclear energy in East Asia, this well-researched article helps illustrate the role of scientists in promoting nuclear energy research in South Korea from the 1950s to the 1970s, especially in light of U.S. governmental opposition to the Nuclear Fuel Project.

To meet the demand for electricity from the increasing number of large-scale industrial plants during the 1970s, the South Korean government, scientists, and engineers planned to obtain expertise and technology to construct and operate nuclear power plants. They prepared to purchase nuclear reactors from commercial corporations such as Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd. Their purchase plans, however, were constrained by the newly emerging international restrictions on the acquisition of certain types of nuclear technology, such as those for the reprocessing of nuclear fuel, enforced primarily by the U.S. government. Kim delineates the processes by which South Korea nuclear scientists and the South Korea government negotiated with the United States government and emphasized the prominent role South Korea nuclear scientists in the negotiation processes.

To contextualize the Nuclear Fuel Project in the 1970s, Kim’s article also includes a brief introduction to South Korea’s first national nuclear research institute and government agency: the Atomic Energy Research Institute (AERI) and the Office of Atomic Energy (OAE). Kim is particularly interested in nuclear scientists and their relationships with the government and political leaders in South Korea. According to Kim, when President Park Chung Hee lost his interest in nuclear research in the 1970s, scientist Hyung Sup Choi played an important role to persuade Park to continue his financial support in nuclear research.

Those interested in this topic will look forward to Kim’s dissertation, Formation of National Institute for Nuclear Research and Boundary-Making: The Case of Atomic Energy Research Institute (1959-1973) in South Korea (Seoul National University, forthcoming, written in Korean).

If you encounter difficulty retrieving this article from your library, you may contact Seong-Jun Kim at joonkim1[at] snu.ac.kr to obtain a copy of this text.

– Honghong Tinn