書本章節:「起始與暫緩」(中文摘要)

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書本章節:「起始與暫緩: 國民黨,科學,與科技」(Greene, 2008)

Greene, J. Megan. 2008. “Starts and Stops: The Kuomintang and Science and Technology.” The Origins of the Developmental State in Taiwan, 14-46. Harvard University Press.

對日本東亞鄰國的核能研究源起感興趣的學者來說,Greene的台灣科學政策史,清楚地解釋核能物理這個領域,在國民黨政府在台灣著手科學研究的過程中的特別角色。在她The Origins of the Developmental State in Taiwan 一書中,特別是「起始與暫緩」一章中,描述了二戰後的一、二十年內,國民黨政府有制度、系統性地在台灣推廣核能研究。這些五零年代和六零年代所建立的核能研究機構中訓練出來的研究者,在八零年代後於核能安全和環境安全的相關公共爭議中擔當要角。該章分析核能研究在台灣早先由國家系統性建置而成的原因和過程。

Greene追蹤從1927年到1958年,國民黨對科學教育和應用研究機構的提倡。1927年到1949年國民黨政府仍在中國時,不遺餘力地支持科學教育和研究,然而到了五零年代,這樣的支持嘎然止息。國民黨政府的決策改變受到許多因素影響。舉例來說,科學機構所需的研究經費對缺乏資源的政府而言是筆不少的支出。再者,若國民黨政府在台灣投資昂貴的研究設施,將意味著「對這個島嶼的永久或等同於永久的承諾」,這與國民黨反攻大陸的計畫相抵觸。

在此歷史脈絡下,Greene認為1950年代的國民黨政府,之所以願意建立數個數個原子能研究機構,是因為意識到這類研究應用在軍事用途的可能性。在43頁到45頁,她描述了台灣最早建立的三個原子能研究機構,及這些機構和美國政府單位和研究機構彼此間的關係。

第一個機構是原子能委員會(AEC),在台灣與美國1955年簽署和平使用原子能協定之後成立,隸屬行政院。第二個機構則是1957年設立於國立清華大學的核能研究所,校園內設置了泳池式反應爐,其中部分資金來自美國原子能委員會,此反應爐在1961年開始運作。第三個機構是中山科學研究院,由行政院原子能委員會成立的軍事單位,在六零年代開始著手核能研究。

Greene的文章剖析國民黨政府對核能研究的興趣,並指出國民黨政府對核能專家培育的投資,和1950年代時國民黨對其他科學的漠然態度形成強烈對比。這個章節很適合關注國家領導科學或是研究冷戰期間不同科學領域的不同角色的課程。

- By Honghong Tinn (鄭芳芳), with translation by Hsiao-Ling Chen (陳曉齡)

CHAPTER: “Starts and Stops” (2008): Nuclear Energy Research Institutes in Taiwan

Greene, J. Megan. 2008. “Starts and Stops,” The Origins of the Developmental State in Taiwan, 14-46. Harvard University Press.

For those interested in the origins of nuclear energy research by Japan’s East Asian neighbors, Greene’s history of science policy in Taiwan elucidates the extraordinary role of nuclear physics in the early history of the Kuomintang government’s investment in scientific research. Her book, in particular the chapter “Starts and Stops,” describes the state’s institution-building efforts to promote nuclear energy research in the first two decades after WWII. Since the 1980s, researchers trained at Taiwan’s nuclear research institutes, established in the ’50s and ’60s, have played an important role in public debates about nuclear energy’s safety and environmental impacts. This book chapter analyzes why and how nuclear energy research was institutionalized by the state in the first place.

Greene traces the historical changes in the Kuomintang government’s promotion of “science education and applied research institutions” from 1927 to 1958. While the Kuomingtang government enthusiastically supported science education and research in China from 1927 to 1949, it ceased to do so when it settled in Taiwan in the ’50s. Many factors contributed to the government’s change of heart. For example, the required scientific facilities were particularly costly for a government that lacked resources. Moreover, investment in such expensive facilities, which “represented a permanent or semipermanent commitment to the island,” contradicted the Kuomingtang leadership’s plan of mainland recovery.

In this historical context, Greene attributes the Kuomingtang government’s willingness to establish several atomic energy research institutions in the 1950s to the potential military applications of such research. From pages 43 to 45, she describes the first three atomic energy research institutions in Taiwan and their relationships with United States government agencies and research institutes.

The first such institution was the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), created under the Executive Yuan (the equivalent of the Cabinet or the Council of Ministers) after the Taiwanese government signed an agreement with the U.S. on the peaceful use of atomic energy in 1955. The second institution was a graduate program in nuclear physics at National Tsing Hua University in 1957. A “swimming pool” reactor, partially funded by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission in 1957, was installed at the university and started to function in 1961. The third institution was the Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology, a military unit established by the AEC, which participated in nuclear research in the 1960s.

Greene’s chapter contextualizes the Kuomingtang government’s interest in nuclear energy research, including its investment in nurturing generations of nuclear scientists, in contrast to its lukewarm attitude toward other sciences in the 1950s. This book chapter would be appropriate for classes interested in state-supported science as well as the various roles of different scientific disciplines during the Cold War.

– Honghong Tinn

ARTICLE: Atoms for Sale? (2010)

DiMoia, John. “Atoms for Sale? Cold War Institution-Building and the South Korean Atomic Energy Project, 1945-1965.” Technology and Culture 51 (2010): 589-618. DOI: 10.1353/tech.2010.0021

South Korea’s nuclear program has a dynamic history. It began with nuclear technology assistance from the U.S. in the 1950s after the Korean War, but South Korea now has its own advanced technologies to export to foreign countries. In this article, John DiMoia suggests an alternative approach to the history of the South Korean nuclear program that differs from both the “transmission model” in the history of technology and the “developmental state” framework in Korean studies. He focuses more on the interactions between American nuclear scientists who assisted in the South Korean nuclear program and local Korean scientists in the late 1950s. Scientists from both countries played active roles in reaching agreements on many issues in establishing the South Korean nuclear program, and they acted on various motivations that included implementing the Atoms for Peace program, supplying electricity for a developing nation, and building a new scientific community. Thus, the scientists’ positions on the nuclear project were not always in sync with those of the state, which resulted in difficulties in selecting the site for the research reactor and determining the pace of the program. DiMoia argues that these kind of complex interactions paved the way for South Korea’s nuclear program. – Seong-Jun Kim

한국의 원자력 프로그램은 다이나믹한 역사를 가지고 있다. 1950년대 미국의 원조로 시작했지만, 이제는 해외에 기술을 수출할 정도가 되었다. 이 논문에서 존 디모야는 기술사에서의 ‘전파 모델’, 한국학에서의 ‘개발국가’ 접근을 넘어서는 다른 접근법을 제시하려 했는데, 그것은 1950년대 한국의 원자력 프로그램에 조언을 했던 미국 과학자와 한국 과학자들간의 상호작용에 더 주목하면서 가능했다. 한미 양측의 과학자들이 모두 각종 이슈들에 대한 합의에 이르는데 기여를 했는데, 그들은 Atoms for Peace 프로젝트의 실행, 국가재건을 위한 전력 공급, 새로운 과학자 그룹의 형성 등 다양한 목적을 염두에 두고 활동했다. 따라서 한국의 원자력 프로그램에 대한 과학자들의 입장은 정부의 태도와 항상 일치하는 것은 아니었다. 저자는 이러한 종류의 복잡한 상호작용이 한국 원자력 프로그램의 경로를 만들었다고 주장한다.  – 김성준

ARTICLE: Atoms for Sale? (2010) [Korean]

DiMoia, John. “Atoms for Sale? Cold War Institution-Building and the South Korean Atomic Energy Project, 1945-1965.” Technology and Culture 51 (2010): 589-618. DOI: 10.1353/tech.2010.0021

한국의 원자력 프로그램은 다이나믹한 역사를 가지고 있다. 1950년대 미국의 원조로 시작했지만, 이제는 해외에 기술을 수출할 정도가 되었다. 이 논문에서 존 디모야는 기술사에서의 ‘전파 모델’, 한국학에서의 ‘개발국가’ 접근을 넘어서는 다른 접근법을 제시하려 했는데, 그것은 1950년대 한국의 원자력 프로그램에 조언을 했던 미국 과학자와 한국 과학자들간의 상호작용에 더 주목하면서 가능했다. 한미 양측의 과학자들이 모두 각종 이슈들에 대한 합의에 이르는데 기여를 했는데, 그들은 Atoms for Peace 프로젝트의 실행, 국가재건을 위한 전력 공급, 새로운 과학자 그룹의 형성 등 다양한 목적을 염두에 두고 활동했다. 따라서 한국의 원자력 프로그램에 대한 과학자들의 입장은 정부의 태도와 항상 일치하는 것은 아니었다. 저자는 이러한 종류의 복잡한 상호작용이 한국 원자력 프로그램의 경로를 만들었다고 주장한다.  – 김성준

FILM: A Is For Atom (1992)

Curtis, Adam. 1992. A is for Atom, Google video, 45:51 min, accessed Apr 24, 2011, from http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-1860517361048002456

The British 45-minute documentary A Is For Atom was named after the 1953 animated short of the ‘Atoms for peace’ campaign with the same title. The final installment of a BBC-2 series about politics and science, called Pandora’s Box, the film tells the story of the development of peaceful nuclear technologies in the United States, Britain and Russia, and how political and business forces of the time contributed to these transformation. In order to make the production of nuclear power plants profitable, for example, private corporations like Westinghouse and General Electric pushed for the construction of bigger plants in order to utilize economies of scale. However, with growing reactor sizes, safe operation could no longer be fully guaranteed. The film shows that despite repeated warnings by senior scientists from the Atomic Energy Commission  and the industry itself, the corporations succeeded in avoiding costly changes to the plant design. In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, political pressure for a rapid electrification of the country coupled with an insufficient budget resulted in inferior reactor designs, which ultimately culminated in the Chernobyl disaster. One of the most unsettling scenes of the film unfurls as AEC scientists state as early as 1964 that “we have found in our present study nothing. . . which guarantees either that major reactor accidents will not occur or that protective safeguard systems will not fail. Should such accidents occur very large damages could result.”  What they refer to are evocative of the problematic design issues of the very type of nuclear reactor that would be used later in the Fukushima No.1 plant that came into operation in 1971.
Christian Dimmer

A 10 minutes longer version of this documentary is available on the blog of director Adam Curtis